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"The Little State Department":
Hollywood and the MPAA's Influence
on U.S. Trade Relations

Kevin Lee*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, the U.S. film industry in Hollywood has
dominated the global entertainment industry. American films appear today
in more than 150 countries, and the Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA"), the film industry's lobbying group, proudly proclaims that the
"U.S. film industry provides the majority of home entertainment products
seen in millions of homes throughout the world."1
Hollywood's worldwide box office revenue amounted to $25.82
billion in 2006.2 Approximately 85% of worldwide ticket sales are directed
toward Hollywood movies,3 and international sales generate approximately
half of the U.S. film industry's revenues.4 At one point the audiovisual
industry was the United States' second largest export industry, following
the aerospace industry. 5 The trade flow in film is entirely one-sided;
American films dominate foreign markets, but foreign films have failed to
establish a significant presence in the U.S. market, accounting for only 1%

*J.D. 2008, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank Olufunmilayo
Arewa for her valuable guidance on this article.
1 Motion Picture Association of America, About Us, http://www.mpaa.org/AboutUs.asp
[hereinafter MPAA-About Us] (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
2 MPA WORLDWIDE MARKET RESEARCH & ANALYSIS,

MPA SNAPSHOT REPORT: 2006

INTERNATIONAL THEATRICAL MARKET 1 (Apr. 2007), availableat http://www.mpaa.org/

Intemational%20Theatrical%2OSnapshot.pdf.
3 Alan Riding, Unesco Adopts New Plan Against CulturalInvasion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,

2005, at E3.
4 Claire Wright, Hollywood's DisappearingAct: International Trade Remedies to Bring

Hollywood Home, 39 AKRON L. REv. 739, 747 (2006).
5 Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The CulturalException, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 281, 281-82 (1997).
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of movies shown.
In this article, I argue that the U.S. government has actively advocated
domestic film industry interests in bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements because of Hollywood's importance to the U.S. economy, and
also because of the MPAA's influential lobbying efforts. Furthermore, I
show that the MPAA has intervened directly in bilateral trade relations to
protect its interests, even when such interests may run counter to the benefit
of the U.S. economy.
In Part II, I explore the nature of the film industry, the economic
growth of the U.S. film industry, and Hollywood's comparative advantage.
Part III provides an overview of the MPAA and the history of its close
relationship with the U.S. government. Part IV, examines U.S. bilateral
trade relations with regard to film, and the actions the MPAA has taken to
advance its interests. Finally, Part V concludes by examining the MPAA's
involvement in multilateral trade agreements relating to the film industry.
II. HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY
A. Film as a Cultural Industry
The complexity of classifying motion pictures as a product is an
important factor in disputes over the global film trade. Films have the dual
personality of both a good and a service, where motion pictures generate
income either as a service in the form of film screenings and broadcasts, or
as a good through the sales of movies in video or disc format. Furthermore,
some countries emphasize the cultural and artistic nature of film, devoting
attention to a movie's content, while other countries look solely at the
commercial aspect of film distribution or sales in the context of trade.
The complex identity of motion pictures gives rise to the description of
the movie business as a cultural industry. A cultural industry is a societal
institution that employs modes of production and organizes industrial
corporations "to produce and disseminate symbols in the form of cultural
goods and services, generally, although not exclusively, as commodities." 7
While the production and distribution of film may be classified as an
"industrial" process, the
actual sale or screening of a movie results in
'8
"cultural consumption.
The contrast between the cultural and economic characteristics of
6 Riding, supra note 3.
7 Luc Wron, The Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry (Columbia Int'l Affairs
Online, Mar. 1999) (quoting Nicholas Garnham, CAPITALISM AND COMMUNICATION (1990)),
available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/vel01
Hollywood Industry].
8

Id.

[hereinafter Competitive Advantage of
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movies is the root of the controversy over Hollywood's dominance of the
global movie market and the status of film in trade agreements. The U.S.
government and the MPAA see films in international trade in solely
economic terms as "commercial products that should be subject to market
forces." 9 In contrast, other countries, most notably France and Canada, have
traditionally tied films to national identity and argue that cultural works
deserve a special status besides that of a regular tradable commodity. 10
These conflicting views have been the source of disagreements over the
propriety of quotas and subsidies as applied to the international film trade.
B. An Economic History of Hollywood
In its early history, the Hollywood film industry was run on the
economic model of the studio system, "a pure example of a Fordist mode of
production and a classic oligopoly."' 1 Under the studio system, a film
studio controlled all stages of a movie's economic life, from the birth of the
screenplay written by a studio-employed writer to film production to final
distribution in a studio-owned theater.
Hollywood's global dominance began in the aftermath of World War I.
The war "seriously disrupted European film industries or forced them out of
international markets," creating a vacuum that the American studios could
fill. 12 The war had a dramatic impact on the trade flow of film. During
1913, the United States exported 32 million feet of film; by 1925, this
figure had risen to 235 million feet.' 3 Between these years, U.S. film
exports to Europe increased by 500%, and the development of film markets
in Asia, ' 14Latin America, and Africa "spurred a tenfold growth in U.S.
exports."

At the height of the studio system era, Hollywood produced an average
of 400 films each year between 1930 and 1950, with a peak of 504 filmsapproximately one film per week for each studio-in 1941.5 However, the
studio system came to an end with the 1948 Paramount Decrees, after a
federal antitrust suit against Paramount Pictures forced the Hollywood
studios to divest their theater chains and mandated competition in the

9 Carolyn Hyun-Kyung Kim, Comment, Building the Korean Film Industry's
Competitiveness, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 353, 364 (2000).

10See Mark Wheeler, Globalization of the Communications Marketplace, 5.3 HARV.

INT'L J. PRESS/POL. 27 (2000).
I Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7.
12W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade and Cultural
Protectionism,20 YALE J. INT'L L. 105, 128 (1995).
13id.
14id.

15Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry,supra note 7.
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exhibition sector.
The studios adapted to the new competitive landscape and restabilized
their markets by increasing film distribution revenues from foreign
markets. 17 During the 1960s, foreign markets accounted for approximately
50% of total revenues. 18 The 1980s and 1990s featured a wave of industry
mergers and acquisitions that reduced Hollywood to six major film
distributors: Buena Vista Pictures Distribution (The Walt Disney
Company), Paramount Pictures Corporation, Sony Pictures Entertainment
Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Studios
LLLP, and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.' 9
C. Hollywood's Competitive Advantage
It is an undisputed fact that Hollywood is the dominant supplier of
audio-visual services to the world.20
Several factors may explain
Hollywood's dominance of the global film industry.
Foreign competitors argue that Hollywood keeps trade flows one-sided
by saturating the U.S. market with an excessive supply of different, but not
so different movies, which serves as a non-tariff barrier for the U.S. film
industry. 2' However, foreign competitors cannot point to the use of quotas
or subsidies that many countries use to protect their domestic film
industries. Neither the U.S. federal government nor California offers
comparable subsidies. Although several states offer incentives to attract
film production, including sales tax exemptions on hotel stays and
streamlined permit procedures, these incentives are significantly less than
the subsidies offered by other countries.22
Wildman and Siwek argue that Hollywood's dominance can be
explained by the size and wealth of the English-speaking market. U.S. film
producers enjoy a "domestic opportunity advantage" because Englishspeaking markets in the United States and other parts of the world are large
and generally wealthy.2 3 Although English trails Mandarin, Hindi, and
Spanish in total global speaker population, film demand is determined by

16 id.

17 Id.

18 id.
19 Id.
20 Id.

21 Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7.
22 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE MIGRATION ON U.S. FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION:
THE IMPACT OF "RUNAWAYS"

ON WORKERS AND SMALL BUSINESSES IN THE U.S. FILM

INDUSTRY 89 (2000), available at http://www.ftac.org/files/doc2000.pdf.
23 Shao, supra note 12, at 133 (citing Steven S. Wildman & Stephen E. Siwek,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1N FILMS AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS (1988)).
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both demographic and economic factors2 4
Some have also argued that the proximity of numerous related and
supporting industries around Hollywood contribute to the film industry's
success.25
For example, film production suppliers, special effects
companies, law firms, talent agencies, and related industries such as
television are all located within Hollywood in the Los Angeles region.
Although all these factors may influence the success of Hollywood films, a
crucial component of the success of the U.S. film industry in international
trade negotiations is Hollywood's close relationship with the U.S.
government.
III. THE MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
A. An Overview of the MPAA
The MPAA is the U.S. film industry's official lobbyinF group, and its
membership includes the six major U.S. film distributors.
The official
purpose of the MPAA and the Motion Picture Association ("MPA"), its
international counterpart, is to "serve as the voice and advocate of the
American motion picture, home video and television industries,
domestically through the MPAA and internationally through the MPA. 27
The organization had a budget of approximately $60 million in 1999.28
The MPAA was founded in 1922 as a reaction to scandal and fears of
government regulation. Public concern began to grow over increasingly
risqu6 film plots and high-profile celebrity criminal trials, which led to a
fear of mass boycotts and government censorship.2 9 In response, the film
industry established the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of
America in 1922 and began to self-regulate by initiating a "moral blacklist"
in Hollywood. 30 The MPAA continues to actively self-regulate today by
issuing movie ratings.
On the international front, the MPAA has focused on keeping foreign
markets open to U.S. films and battling film piracy. The MPA was formed
in 1945 as the Motion Picture Export Association of America, with the goal
of reestablishing American films in the world market in the aftermath of
World War II, and in response to growing barriers to the importation of
24 Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7 (citing Steven S. Wildman
& Stephen E. Siwek, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN FILMS AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS (1988)).
25

Id.

26 Motion Picture Association of America, Members Page, http://www.mpaa.org/About

UsMembers.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
27 MPAA-About Us, supra note 1.
28 CompetitiveAdvantage of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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American films. 3 1 The organization's experience in negotiating on its own
with foreign governments has earned it the moniker of "the little State
Department," and its foreign activities span the diplomatic, economic, and
political arenas. 32 Based in Washington, D.C., the MPA also has offices in
Los Angeles, California, Brussels, Sdo Paulo, Singapore, and Toronto.33
Although the MPAA engages in a variety of activities, its efforts are
united by the common theme of minimizing government interference by
preventing government censorship on the domestic side, and fighting trade
barriers and securing property rights in the international arena.34
B. Domestic Industry Groups and Government Trade Relations
Domestic interest groups like the MPAA constantly seek to lobby their
governments in order to advance their interests in foreign trade relations.
Throughout history, interest groups have competed in the political
marketplace to establish favorable institutions and special interest
provisions with their governments in order to advance their economic
interests.35 Government cooperation to advance private interests in the
international sphere originated from the classical understanding of
international law which recognized only states as actors, where a
government would assert its "sovereign prerogative" to negotiate treaties
that reflected the considerable influence of domestic industries.36
Under the modern international system, however, non-state actors have
greater recognition. As Okediji observes, "the state and private industries
that dominate the globalization process collaborate in greater concert than
previous milieus of international law and international relations could have
foreseen or facilitated. 3 7 Domestic industries have a wide opportunity to
assert influence in Washington because of the requirement of implementing
legislation to give domestic effect to treaty obligations.
The need for
31MPAA-About Us, supra note 1.
32 Thomas H. Guback, Hollywood's International Market, in THE AMERICAN FILM

INDUSTRY 463, 471 (Tino Balio ed., rev. ed. 1985); see also MPAA-About Us, supra note
1.
33MPAA-About Us, supra note 1.
34 Luc V6ron, Hollywood and Europe: A Case of Trade in CulturalIndustries, the 1993
GA TTDispute (Columbia Int'l Affairs Online, 1999), availableat http://www.ciaonet.org/
wps/vel02 [hereinafter Hollywood and Europe].
35See Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, ConstitutionalizingPatents:From Venice
to Philadelphia, 3-7 (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper 04-12,
2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-585661.

36 See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
819, 837, 851-52 (2003) [hereinafter Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO].
17Id. at 879-81.
38 See Ruth L. Okediji, The InternationalRelations of Intellectual Property, 7 SING. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 315, 375, 381 (2003).
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Congress to enact domestic legislation thus gives interests groups a "second
bite at the apple" for rent-seeking and to influence the domestic effects of
relevant treaties. 39
American industry groups began to play a prominent role in treaty
negotiations beginning with an 1878 conference in Paris on patents. During
this conference the prominent role of American private actor interests
represented a change of industry actors growing from followers to leaders
in seeking enhanced intellectual property ("IP") protection. 40 In past
decades, American private sector actors have actively led and promoted
new multilateral regimes to expand and protect their property rights, as
embodied by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") during the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").4 '
The MPAA provides an effective example of how interest group
lobbying can influence a government to advocate its interests in the
international system, as well as an example of how a private sector actor
can exert its economic influence independently in the international arena.
C. The MPAA's Economic Influence
In a 2005 report, the MPAA estimated that the U.S. film industry
employs 359,100 people.42 Most employees live in California, although the
film industry contributes significantly to the economies of other states, most
notably New York and Illinois.43 In a 1998 study, the MPAA estimated
Hollywood's direct economic impact on the California economy amounted
to $27.5 billion in 1996, with a total direct employment of 226,000
people. 4 These figures do not account for the approximately 50,000 jobs in
companies specializing in supporting the entertainment industry, including
law firms, accounting firms, talent
multimedia programming, advertising,
45
agencies, and catering companies.
While Hollywood has a significant importance to the U.S. economy,
some have argued that the industry's powerful influence in Washington is
not proportionate to its actual economic impact. The jobs created by the
film industry represent only approximately 5% of civilian employment in
39 Id.
40 Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Policy in HistoricalPerspective, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 267, 293-94 (2004) [hereinafter IntellectualPropertyand Public Policy].
41 See id. at 314; see also infra Part V.B.

42 MPA WORLDWIDE MARKET RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, US ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY:

2005 MPA MARKET STATISTICS 25 (2006), available at http://www.entertainmentecon.org/

edp/File/Report/MPA 05_EconomicReview.pdf.
43 Wright, supra note 4, at 747.
44

45

Hollywood and Europe, supra note 34.

id.
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Southern California, and Hollywood's direct output represents only about
5% of the added value created in the Los Angeles area, or a total of only
1.5% in California.46 One explanation for why Hollywood's economic
importance is inflated is the strength and history of Hollywood's
relationship with Washington.
D. MPAA-U.S. Government Relations
Although the domestic film industry's size and economic strength
provides Hollywood a voice in Washington, the MPAA's influence in
Washington is not based solely on economic factors. Hollywood enjoys a
special relationship with Washington "based on a sort of mutual
fascination., 47 As Brownstein has noted, "[p]ractical campaign help and
mutual social envy explain much of the attraction between Washington and
Hollywood, but not all of it."'48 The mutual fascination between politicians
and the film industry has a particular resonance for each side; by associating
with celebrities, politicians affirm their legitimacy, and celebrities view
politics aspart of a quest for respectability and just another stage to exercise
their ego. In other words,
"the capital of power and the capital of glamour
50
bound.,
inextricably
are
One can also explain the close ties between the MPAA and the
government based on the fact that so many of the organization's leaders and
employees have high-level experience working in the federal government.
The MPAA's first president, Will Hays, was a former U.S. Postmaster
General and a former chairman of the Republican National Committee who
ran Warren Harding's 1920 presidential campaign. 5' Jack Valenti, the
MPAA president from 1966-2004, was a former adviser to President
Lyndon B. Johnson.52 Dan Glickman, the current MPAA president, was a
former Secretary of Agriculture and a former congressman from Kansas.53
These ties are not just restricted to the leadership position. The MPAA has
"always been packed with diplomats, trade specialists, and lawyers with
substantial government experience. 54

46

Id.

47 Id.
48 RONALD BROWNSTEIN, THE POWER AND THE GLITTER: THE HOLLYWOOD-WASHINGTON
CONNECTION 12
9
4 1 d. at 11.

(1990).

50 Id. at 15.

51 THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 125 (Tino Balio ed., rev. ed. 1985).
52 Competitive Advantage

of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7.
53 Motion
Picture
Association
of America,
Chairman
http://www.mpaa.org/AboutUsGlickman.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
54 Hollywood andEurope, supra note 34.

Dan

Glickman,
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1. Relations During World War I
The film industry's ties to the government on the matter of
international trade date back to World War I. In 1916, prior to the MPAA's
creation, U.S. consuls "were instructed to report on the market for
American movies," and "the government, in turn, made this information
available to the industry." 55 American dominance of the global film market
in the post-war era led to industry concerns about maintaining open
markets. By the 1920s, many countries had already noticed that Hollywood
products accounted for approximately four-fifths of all film screenings in
the world.56 Facing a deluge of American films in their domestic markets,
governments began to establish trade barriers to shelter their domestic film
industries. 57 These new barriers prompted Hollywood to seek help from
Washington, and the U.S. State Department represented Hollywood's
interests and advocated freer trade to benefit the industry.58
2. RelationsDuring World War H
During World War II, Hollywood cooperated closely with the U.S.
government in support of its war aims by assisting with the country's
information campaign.59 In the immediate aftermath of the war, the
government believed that the export of films would help bring American
ideals into destabilized areas, especially in Europe, to fight the spread of
communism.60 President Truman "secretly supported propaganda schemes
that included the promotion of U.S. film exports.''
In an official 1944 "Circular to All Diplomatic Officers," Assistant
Secretary of State A.A. Berle stated:
The Department desires to cooperate fully in the protection of the
American motion picture industry abroad. It expects in return that
the industry will cooperate wholeheartedly with this government
with a view to insuring that the pictures distributed abroad will
reflect credit62 on the good name and reputation of this country and
institutions.
Relations between the MPAA and the government were so close, the
MPAA "was permitted to use State Department secure communications

55Id.

56 Shao, supra note 12, at 128.
17 See id. at 129.
58 See id.
59See Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7.
60 Shao, supra note 12, at 129.
61 id.
62 Hollywood and Europe, supra note 34.
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facilities for sensitive messages. 63 Washington and Hollywood therefore
derived a mutual benefit from their relationship during World War II and
the early years of the Cold War. Hollywood could count on Washington to
negotiate lower foreign trade barriers and, in turn, Washington relied on
Hollywood to spread American ideals to engender sympathies for the
United States and to counteract communist influence. However, there were
still certain boundaries that Hollywood could not cross; "In many cases, the
[MPAA] negotiated directly with foreign governments, threatening US
retaliations in some instances. '64
3. Recent Relations
In recent decades, film piracy has become a top concern for the
MPAA. The MPAA claims that its member studios lose approximately
$6.1 billion each year as a result of piracy. 65 Consequently, the MPAA
established its international anti-piracy program in 1976, with its goals to:
[I]mplement and strengthen existing copyright legislation, assist
local governments and law enforcement authorities in the
investigation and prosecution of piracy cases, initiate civil litigation
on behalf of its Member Companies against copyright infringers,
and... work[] to strengthen 66
the copyright law of other nations and
suggest appropriate penalties.
Amendments to Section 301 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
institutionalized private sector participation in foreign trade policy by
giving private petitioners the right to seek government redress.6 7 This
effectively made Section 301 a powerful weapon for domestic industries
who claimed they were aggrieved by foreign trade practices.6 8
Under the "Special 301" procedure, the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR") identifies "priority countries" with rampant IP
rights violations.69 If the identified country does not negotiate with the
United States within six months or if negotiations are ineffective, the
United States has the right to impose unilateral trade sanctions. 70 The
63

Id.

64Id.
65 MOTION PIcTuRE ASSOCIATION, ANTI-PIRACY FACT SHEET: ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 1

(2006), http://www.mpaa.org/AsiaPacificPiracyFactSheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
66 Stephen K. Shiu, Comment, Motion Picture Piracy: Controllingthe Seemingly Endless
Supply of Counterfeit Optical Discs in Taiwan, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 607, 617 (2006).

67 Susan K. Sell, Industry Strategiesfor Intellectual Propertyand Trade, 10 CARDozo J.

INT'L & COMP. L. 79, 82 (2002) [hereinafter Industry Strategies].
68 Id.

69 Shiu, supra note 66, at 622.
70 Id.
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USTR has been "remarkably responsive" to the requests of key private
sector actors, and the MPAA views Special 3017 1as an important tool to
influence IP protection reforms in other countries.
During the early 1980s, MPAA president Jack Valenti became an
outspoken critic of foreign copyright piracy, and was the moving force
behind the creation of the International Intellectual Property Alliance
("IIPA") in 1984.72 The IIPA's objective is to promote copyright interests,
and the alliance
and its members have actively made use of the Section 301
73
process.

The MPAA has also acted independently of the U.S. government to
enforce its interests in preventing film piracy. In recent years, the MPAA
has initiated local litigation and has actively encouraged local enforcement
efforts to seize pirated movies. Although the MPAA did not seize any
illegal Digital Versatile Discs ("DVD") anywhere in the world in 1998; by
2002, the MPAA had seized seven million illegal DVDs and twenty-six
million
Video CDs worldwide, and the number of seizures continues to
74
grow.
The MPAA thus has successfully influenced bilateral trade relations
through lobbying with the U.S. government, and also by resorting to
independent means of working directly with local governments around the
world.
IV. BILATERAL RELATIONS
A. Canada
The Canadian government is vocal in arguing that films are a cultural
product, and therefore should be treated as an exception to free trade
agreements. The "unrelenting flow" of American cultural products has
motivated Canada to support a cultural protection agenda in trade
negotiations.7 5
Canada carved out an exception for films during negotiations over the
1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement ("CFTA"). Under Article 2005
of CFTA, "cultural industries" were exempt from the agreement provisions
liberalizing bilateral trade.76 Article 2012 of CFTA included enterprises
71Id. at 630; see also Industry Strategies, supra note 67, at 101.
72 SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION
PROPERTY RIGHTS

84, 100 (2003) [hereinafter

OF INTELLECTUAL

PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW].

73 Id.
74 Shiu, supra note 66, at 612-13.
75 Eireann Brooks, Comment, Cultural Imperialism vs. Cultural Protectionism:
Hollywood's Response to UNESCO Efforts to Promote Cultural Diversity, 5 HOFSTRA J.
INT'L BUS. & L. 112, 126 (2006).
76

Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Jan. 2, 1988, availableat http://

Northwestern Journal of

International Law & Business

28:371 (2008)

engaged in "the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video
recordings" under the definition of "cultural industries." 77 This provision
was reproduced in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") at Canada's insistence.78 The main purpose of the CFTA and
NAFTA cultural exclusion clause is to "protect Canada from losing its
cultural identity from a massive influx of U.S. works, which the Canadian
public eagerly consumes," and the language of the provision focuses
narrowly on industries likely to affect Canadian cultural identity, such as
film rather than opera or dance. 79
Despite its traditional protests against cultural exceptions as
antithetical to free trade, the MPAA has been willing to deviate from free
trade principles when U.S. film studios benefit from foreign subsidies. The
chief example of such a subsidy is Canada's Production Services Tax Credit
("PSTC"). Established in 1977, the PSTC is a subsidy that grants a tax
credit of 16% of qualified labor costs to any film company, domestic or
foreign, that films in Canada with a project budget of at least one million
Canadian dollars.80 A foreign company only needs to establish a Canadian
corporation and employ Canadian labor to qualify,
as there is no
8
requirement of "Canadian content" in the film itself. '
The PSTC has been so successful in attracting U.S. film companies to
film their productions in Canada, the country is often referred to as
"Hollywood North., 82 A 2001 study found that approximately one-third of
all feature films in North America were produced in Canada. 83 While the
major U.S. film studios welcome the subsidies because of the benefits of
lowered production costs without cultural content requirements, the export
of film production to Canada has generated resistance from domestic film
workers who fear the increase in loss of jobs at home.
Hollywood is a unionized industry and since the Depression era unions
and guilds have played a major role in the entertainment industry.84 By
filming in Canada and utilizing local labor, Hollywood film companies can
also save on costs by avoiding more stringent union rules which they would
be subject to at home. In a 2000 report, the U.S. Department of Commerce
estimated that this "runaway production" to Canada resulted in production

wehner.tamu.edu/mgmt.www/NAFTA/fta/complete.pdf.
77 Id.

78 Hollywood and Europe, supra note 34.
79Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 5, at 290-91.
80 Wright, supra note 4, at 751-52.
81 Id. at 743, 752.
82 Id. at 740.

83 Meg James, Study Finds More Films Shot in Canada, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2001, at
B2, available at 2001 WLNR 10504928.
84 See Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7.
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cost losses of $2 billion to the U.S. economy in 1999.85
The film industry unions and their coalition, the Film and Television
Action Committee ("FTAC"), have lobbied the U.S. government to stop the
outsourcing of American film production jobs. In 2001, the FTAC filed a
petition with the Department of Commerce under section 701 of the 1930
Tariff Act to investigate whether the United States should impose
countervailing duties against Canada for the PSTC subsidy.8 6 The MPAA
responded by filing a petition attacking the petitioners' standing, and the
FTAC subsequently withdrew its petition and did not refile. 87 However, the
FTAC now plans to attack the PSTC through a Section 301(a) "unfair trade
practices" petition to call for the USTR to pressure Canada to rescind its
subsidies, or else face referral to the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
for dispute settlement.8 8
The MPAA has argued that the PSTC incentives are not inconsistent
with WTO obligations, as there has been no material injury to the domestic
film industry, as Hollywood continues to be profitable8 9 The MPAA's
attempts to defend the PSTC illustrate that the MPAA is not a consistent
proponent of free trade, at least when its members benefit from foreign
subsidies. Instead, the MPAA will lobby for the economic interests of its
own members, even when doing so appears to go against the interests of the
U.S. economy.
B. Europe
U.S. films represent approximately 80% of the films distributed in
European theaters, and over 55% of the films shown on European television
networks. 90 In the pre-World War I era, the U.S. film industry lagged its
European competitors, "particularly those of France and Italy, in such
matters as feature production which had been invented by the Europeans
and the establishment of permanent theatres." 91 However, World War I
ended Europe's advances and established Hollywood's dominance. 92
European countries first began to implement screen quotas during the
interwar period to curb the excessive export of American films and to
ensure that local films would continue to be exhibited.9 3 In the 1920s, the
85DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 22, at 21.
86

Wright, supra note 4, at 818.

87 Id.

88See Film and Television Action Committee, The Facts About FTAC's Section 301(a)
Filing,available at http://www.ftac.netihtml/30 1a-2.html.
89Wright, supra note 4, at 802.
90Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 5, at 281.

91Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7.
92 See id.

93Brooks, supra note 75, at 120.
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U.S. State Department intervened on the U.S. film industry's behalf in
France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia on the basis of
a need for freer trade.94 Both the government and the film producers
supported this policy by pointing out that the United States did not restrict
the import of foreign films into its own domestic market. In reality, the
dominance of the major
studios in domestic U.S. distribution severely
9

limited market access. 4
World War II brought another crushing blow to the European film
industry. The dominant European players, Germany's UFI conglomerate
and Italy's Cinecitta, were dismantled or annihilated by bombings.9 6 As in
the aftermath of World War I, the U.S. film industry filled the vacuum by
flooding the European market with a backlog of previously unplayed
American films. 97 Thereafter, American films maintained a dominant
position in the European market.
With closer integration during the 1980s, European films began to
benefit from regional arrangements and subsidies to protect European film
industries. In 1989, the European Union ("EU") issued the "Television
Without Frontiers" Directive, which required at least 50% of audio-visual
products broadcast over European television to be of European origin.98 The
European Union also employs subsidies though Eurimages funds and the
European Convention on Cinematographic Co-production, alongside
individual state subsidies. 99 More than 60% of European films receive
annual national and regional subsidies totaling $1 billion. l0 0
The European Union's embrace of the cultural exception to free trade,
which justifies the use of film subsidies and quotas for cultural protection,
came to the forefront during heated negotiations with the United States and
the MPAA during the GATT Uruguay Round. During these negotiations,
the MPAA and the United States argued against the inclusion of a cultural
exception to the liberalization of global trade. 0 1 The aggressiveness of
MPAA lobbying in Europe had the counteractive effect of leading EU
member-states to close ranks. Because the European Union refused to back
down from its position, both sides settled on an "agreement to disagree" on
the existence of a cultural exception to film. 10 2
Following these
negotiations, Jack Valenti turned from "chief arsonist" to leader of the "fire

94 Shao, supra note 12, at 129.
95 See id.; Guback, supra note 32, at 467.
96 Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7.

97 See Guback, supra note 32, at 471.
98 Kim, supra note 9, at 368.
99 Id. at 369-70.
1oo Id.

l0 See infra Part V.A.
102 See id.
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brigade," and MPAA and USTR0 3officials traveled throughout Europe in
1994 and 1995 to repair relations.
A general analysis of the European film trade provides only a
backdrop for the long and often contentious trade relationship the MPAA
has enjoyed with individual European countries. The following study of the
United Kingdom and France provides two examples of the development
and changes to this trading relationship over the past century.
1.United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has traditionally been one of the most profitable
sources of foreign revenue for Hollywood. Statistics show that "[b]y 1925,
a third of all foreign revenue came from the United Kingdom alone, where
American films captured 95% of the market.' 0 4 The cultural impact of the
deluge of American films did not go unnoticed, as a Hollywood industry
executive observed that "American producers are now actively
'Americanizing'
England, her dominions and colonies, and all of
10 5
Europe.'
In response, the British Parliament passed the Cinematograph Films
Act in 1927, which required that a certain minimum proportion of films
shown in British theaters be domestic in origin. 0 6 Hollywood responded to
the new quotas by making "quota quickies," or cheap movies made locally
in the United Kingdom to comply with the law. 10 7 Parliament responded
again in 1938 with the passage of the Films Act of 1938, which attempted
to legislate the quota quickies out of existence by establishing a minimum
cost test.10 8 The United Kingdom eventually abandoned the screen quota
policy during World War 11. 9
Today the United Kingdom employs state subsidies to support its film
industry. British Screen Finance, which is owned by four U.K. film
corporations," i0 provides a subsidy with a "quasi-commercial character" to
local film producers."' In addition to providing a "U.K. perspective," the
films must also be commercial, in an effort to encourage high-quality and
profitable films.' 12 British Screen Finance also provides incentives for
103Hollywood and Europe,supra note 34.
104 Guback, supra note 32, at 466.
'0' Id. at 468.
106Hollywood and Europe, supra note 34.
107 Guback, supra note 32, at 469.
108Id.

Id. at 470.
10 The companies are Rank, United Artists' Screen Entertainment, Channel Four, and
109

Granada. Kim, supra note 9, at 371
111Id.
112id.
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U.K.-linked international co-productions. 113 Under this subsidy system, the
domestic market share of U.K. films rose from 3% in 1993 to 23% in
1997.114

The MPAA's chief concern in the United Kingdom is now piracy. The
MPAA claims that Hollywood loses out on approximately $120 million
each year due to piracy in the United Kingdom. 1 5 The MPAA's activities
in the United Kingdom now concentrate on the extensive optical disc piracy
market, and it seized 2.4 million pirated items in the United Kingdom in
2003.116

2. France
While U.S. films garner the greatest share of the French film market,
Hollywood's 65% market share is significantly smaller than its average of
90% market share elsewhere in Europe." 7 The relative success of the
French film industry can be attributed to France's trade barriers to film and
its age-old fear of the cultural threat posed by U.S. films.
France is one of the most vocal proponents of the cultural view of
cinema. French intellectuals see filmmaking as an art form and scorn
American films for representing "vulgar commercialism." ' " 8 The French
government has adopted this cultural view and provides the domestic film
industry with subsidies encouraging innovative, "art-house" films. 19 The
non-economic view of cinema appears even in French methods of
measuring film success, which relies on the number of tickets sold rather
practice of tabulating the dollar amount of gross box
than the U.S. industry
12
office receipts. 0
France instituted its first trade barriers to American films in 1928,
when the French education minister established a national film quota
system on the basis of public morality, state security, and safeguarding
French culture.' 2' Following World War II, France eased its restrictions on
Hollywood films out of the need for U.S. aid for post-war reconstruction.
In 1946, French Prime Minister L~on Blum signed an agreement with U.S.
13 Id.
114Id.
"15

MPA WORLDWIDE MARKET RESEARCH, 2004 EUROPEAN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT

SHEETS

13
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(2004),

available at

http://www.mpaa.org/EuropeanPiracyFactSheet.pdf

EUROPEAN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET].

116 Id. at 13-14.
117 Brooks, supra note 75, at 124.
118 Kim, supra note 9, at 371.
119 Id.
120 Competitive Advantage of Hollywood Industry, supra note 7.
121Bill Grantham, America the Menace: France'sFeud with Hollywood, WORLD POL'Y
J., Summer 1998, available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/grantham.html.
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Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, whereby France lifted restrictions on
U.S. film imports in exchange for $1 billion worth of credits.1 22 As a result
of the Blum-Byrnes Agreement, the releases of French movies declined
from ninety-six in 1945 to seventy-eight in 1947. In comparison, not less
than 338 U.S. movies were released in French theatres in the first half of
1947. 123

The French movie industry reacted with anger, and in 1948 French
actors and directors led large demonstrations in Paris against the BlumByrnes Agreement. 124 In response to the protests and lobbying, the French
government negotiated and entered into a new quota agreement in 1948
with the MPA and the U.S. State Department permitting 121 American
films to enter France each year, while the rest of the world12 5was left
competing for a separate annual import quota of 65 foreign films.
The Blum-Byrnes Agreement helped create a "powerful national
myth" in the French film industry that quotas were the only means by which
France could protect its domestic film industry and cultural identity, and
that Hollywood "would deploy all its economic and political muscle to
defeat the French." 126 The French film industry maintained this attitude
when it mobilized in 1993 during the heated negotiations over the status of
film in the Uruguay Round, as France took 'the
diplomatic lead in resisting
27
the latest attempt at U.S. cultural "invasion.'
France also places strict limits on Hollywood films in television
broadcasts. Although the European Union's Television Without Borders
directive allows each EU member to set stricter quotas, France is the only
member country that has done so. 128 France reavuires a 40% ceiling
broadcast time on television for non-European films.'
In addition to quotas, France utilizes subsidies to protect its film
industry. France was the European country which established the practice
of providing government subsidies to its film, music, theater, and opera
industries in the interests of cultural protection. 30 The French Center for
Cinematography and SOFICA are the two organizations which provide
subsidies with the purpose of promoting both French film production and
distribution.'31
122 Id.; see also Hollywood and Europe, supra note 34.
123 Hollywood andEurope, supra note 34.
124
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C. Russia

The MPAA has been more successful in exercising its influence in
Russia than in the European Union. During the Cold War, Hollywood
formally established a foothold in the Soviet Union when the MPAA signed
an independent agreement with the U.S.S.R.'s Minister of Cinematography
in 1988. 32 The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Film Panel Agreement allowed the American
studios to market their films in the Soviet Union by sharing box office
revenue and through the construction and leasing of theaters." 3 However,
the U.S.S.R. and officials from Groskino, the state-run film distributor,
largely ignored the agreement.' 34 The MPAA retaliated in 1991 by placing
an embargo on the export of American films to the Soviet Union. 13
The MPAA later flexed its muscles during negotiations over the 1991
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement. As a result of MPAA lobbying and
pressure, the agreement was delayed because of the Soviet Union's lax
copyright laws. 36 The MPAA used its film embargo and political pressure
to successfully convince the Soviet legislature to propose stricter copyright
laws, although the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 precluded
ratification.' 13 Following the breakup of the U.S.S.R., the MPAA lifted its
embargo on all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
except Russia, and it held off on resuming
trade until the Russian
1
parliament enacted appropriate copyright laws.
During the 1990s, the Russian film industry collapsed and fell into a
state of disrepair as American films flooded into the market with an average
of eighty American releases per year.139 Although Russia has resurrected
its film industry in recent years, Hollywood films still dominate the local
market, with local revenues jumping from $10 million in 199940to $215
million in 2004, out of $268 million in total Russian film revenue.
The MPAA now concentrates on anti-piracy efforts in Russia. The
MPAA estimates that it suffered $275 million in losses due to Russian
piracy in 2003, where the local piracy level was estimated to be 75%. 141
The raiding of illegal production lines is now the MPAA's top priority in
132 Lana C. Fleishman, The Empire Strikes Back: The Influence of the United States
Motion Picture Industry on Russian Copyright Law, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189, 218-19
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135 Id.

136Id.at 189-90; 214-15.
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Russia with 5.1 million illegal videos and discs seized in 2003.42
D. Asia
1. China
The U.S. film industry faces substantial market access problems in
China in the forms of strict import quotas, a lengthy censorship review
process, and cultural "blackout" periods. China currently allows just
twenty foreign films to be imported each year, which falls grossly short of
the voracious Chinese demand for Hollywood films. 143 The USTR has
advocated on Hollywood's behalf
by pressing Beijing for greater Chinese
144
market access for U.S. films.
The MPAA has also expressed its frustration at China's mandatory
censorship process, which takes "two to three times longer than the process
in other Asian markets with similar censorship requirements."'' 45 According
to the MPAA, "China typically takes fifteen to thirty days and sometimes
longer to finish its censorship process of films, while Korea takes on
average seven to ten days, Singa4 ore generally takes about seven days,
Taiwan takes five to seven days."'
China has also instituted periodic cultural blackout days where foreign
films cannot be shown, in order to "encourage more upright pursuits"
among the nation's youth.147 However, some have concluded that the
blackouts "are more an effort to protect China's domestic releases than a
policy choice to 'purify the screen."" 148 The MPAA believes that all of
these policies act to limit the legitimate importation of U.S. films, and thus
create a large and extremely profitable market for DVD pirates to satisfy the
14 9
vast Chinese demand for Hollywood films.
Piracy and the protection of IP rights are the focus of MPAA activity
in China. The MPAA estimates China's piracy rate of 90% to be the
highest in the world.150 Concerns over rampant IP violations led the MPAA
Id. at 10.
143 Carl Erik Heiberg, Comment, American Films in China, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 219,
236
142

(2006).
144 Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Deputy USTR to Visit China May 24-26
(May 24, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press-Releases/2004/
May/DeputyUSTR toVisitChinaMay24-26.html?ht-.
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to lobby the USTR to impose sanctions under Section 301 throughout the
1980s and 1990s. Additionally, the USTR obliged Hollywood's concerns
by threatening Beijing with sanctions, non-renewal of most favored nation
status, and opposition to China's entry into the WTO.1 5 1 As a result, China
signed separate commitments to IP protection in 1992, 1995, and 1996, and
also carried out domestic legal reforms in preparation for entrance to the
WTO. 152 However, piracy remained rampant and IP protections were not
enforced.
Because the MPAA has been unable to rely on either the USTR or
Chinese government action to enforce IP laws on a consistent basis, the
MPAA and its member studios have acted on their own in recent years to
enforce IP rights in Chinese courts. In 2003, three MPAA companies
obtained a judgment in a Shanghai court against two local DVD companies
that had sold pirated versions of MPAA films. 53
2. South Korea
The MPAA has been active in South Korea in advocating for greater
IP protection and the elimination of the government's screen quotas. The
MPAA focused on South Korea in its early attempts at obtaining greater IP
protections in foreign countries through Section 301.
Jack Valenti
successfully carried out direct negotiations with Seoul over inadequate IP
protections in 1985, and he later testified before Congress: "I've just come
through a long and tortuous negotiation under a 301 filing with
the
154
Republic of Korea ....They understood what I was talking about."
South Korea originally implemented screen quotas in 1966 to "filter
out Western influences."' 5 5 The MPAA has concentrated most of its recent
activity in Seoul on the elimination or reduction of South Korea's screen
quotas, both through the USTR and through direct negotiations with Seoul.
Hollywood has offered incentives in return for the quota's repeal and at one
point offered to invest $500 million in the Korean film and theater business
in exchange for removal of the screen quota. 156 In 1999, Jack Valenti visited
Korea to urge the quota's repeal and "suggested that American filmmakers
would provide the training necessary for the Korean film industry to
become more competitive."
Instead of accomplishing its objectives, the MPAA's aggressiveness
has had the opposite effect of mobilizing the Korean film industry to protect
151Heiberg, supra note 143, at 225-26.
152 Id. at 226.

15'
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the quota. Korean filmmakers adopted the cultural exception view and
argued that "films should be treated as cultural products," and "the screen
quota is needed to protect and promote Korean culture."'' 58 Despite the
quota, Korean filmmakers throughout the 1990s had difficulty capturing
significant market share against U.S. and other foreign films.' 59 Between
1993 and 1998, Korean films only accounted for 15-25% of domestic ticket
sales. 160 In order to increase domestic film production, the Ministry of
Culture and Tourism announced in 62000 that it would begin to provide
subsides to the Korean film industry.' 1
The global success of Korean films in recent years have allowed the
USTR and Hollywood to claim that the screen quotas and the cultural
protection argument are now unnecessary, as Korean movies have become
internationally competitive.' 62 At a 2005 press conference, USTR Rob
Portman stated:
As you know, we believe that the quota should be reduced, and this
has been a consistent U.S. position....

I will make a personal

comment here, which is that Korean films are very competitive.
63
They are considered some of the best films in the world.
Korean filmmakers have countered by claiming that the screen quotas
are the driving force behind the industry's recent success.' 64 However, the
USTR was ultimately successful in convincing Seoul to lower the screen
quotas as a precursor to the opening of talks on a proposed U.S.-South
Korea free trade agreement. 65 The Korean government
decided to cut the
66
screen quota in half from 146 days to 73 days.'
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V. MULTINATIONAL TREATIES
A. GATS
Debates over the status of films in international trade took place during
the original negotiations over GATT in 1947. Article IV of GATT allowed
states to establish and maintain "internal quantitative regulations relating to
exposed cinematograph films" in the form of screen quotas, "computed on
the basis of screen time per theatre per year."1 67 The drafters "strongly
believed that, because of their unique capacity to diffuse political values,
cinematographic films should be treated specifically."' 168 The United States
ultimately conceded this exception to GATT believing that it would be in
the financial interests of theater owners to show U.S. films because of their
popularity, which would prevent significant screen quotas from taking
effect. 169

The debate over whether film should have a special status in free trade
agreements was renewed during negotiations over the General Agreement
on Trade in Services ("GATS") during the Uruguay Round, which
reclassified motion picture distribution and exhibition as an audiovisual
service." 7 On one side, the European states sought an explicit cultural
exception for motion pictures in GATS that would permit quotas and
subsidies, and argued that 17trade agreements should not result in a "loss of
their cultural sovereignty." 1
On the other hand, the United States and the MPAA viewed the "loss
of identity" argument as merely "a sham and pretext to establishing trade
barriers against U.S. goods in a crucial area of trade."' 172 Audiovisual
services were the "final sticking point" of the Uruguay Round after heated
negotiations on agricultural and aerospace goods had been concluded,
which created great pressure on both sides to come to an agreement. 73
The removal of trade barriers to film exports were of great importance
to both the U.S. government and the MPAA. At the time, the audiovisual
sector returned $3.5 billion each year in surplus balance of payments to the
United States. 174 Both the government and the MPAA believed that even
greater revenues could be generated from film exports with the removal of
167 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. IV, Oct. 30, 1947, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/gatt47 e.pdf.
168 Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 5, at 287.
169 See Shao, supra note 12, at 111.
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trade barriers. 175 High profile American directors, such as Steven Spielberg
and Martin Scorsese, publicly attacked the European trade barriers.176
The MPAA had full support and cooperation from the U.S.
government. President Clinton regarded the issue as so important that he
personally called European leaders "to inform them that he had no intention
of backing down over the audiovisual industry."''17 During this time, the
President also gave assurances to the U.S.78film industry at a $2 million
Democratic Party fundraiser in Hollywood.
However, the MPAA's aggressiveness had a counterproductive effect
of uniting opposition to any liberalization of barriers in the audiovisual
sector. Jack Valenti and the MPAA managed to achieve the unique feat in
French politics of binding all parties together "in an anti-American
consensus to protect French culture."' 179 French President Mitterand was
moved to declare, "[w]hat is at stake is the cultural identity of all our
nations.' 80 Furthermore, EU negotiation coordinator Hugo Paeman was
critical of the MPAA's belief that it had the power to hold up
negotiations.181
Ultimately, the European Union and the United States failed to reach a
substantive agreement on the audiovisual sector, and they "agreed to
disagree" on an exception for the sector in GATS. Although the Europeans
proudly proclaimed that the cultural identity of Europe had been saved, in
reality, no cultural exception was placed into GATS. 82 Following the end
of the negotiations, the MPAA released a statement stating: "Contrary to
many press reports, audiovisual services were not excluded from the new
are no 'cultural carve outs' or other special treatments
services rules. There
183
for this sector.'
The MPAA was correct on this account. Although Hollywood and the
U.S. government did not succeed in its bid to fully liberalize the audiovisual
sector, the Uruguay Round did not give the European Union or any country
the permanent right to erect barriers to film imports. Instead, what the
European Union effectively won was the "temporary exclusion of the
audiovisual sector from the liberalization process of GATS."' 8 4 Any
agreement on the status of the audiovisual sector was left to future rounds
175Id.
176
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of negotiations.
B. TRIPS
TRIPS achieved the integration of IP into the global context of
trade. 185 The basic objective of TRIPS "is to give adequate and effective
protection to intellectual property rights, so that the owners of these rights
receive the benefits of their creativity and inventiveness."' 186 Rather than
being a result of a state-centric negotiation process, however, TRIPS was
largely the responsibility of private sector activism,
and especially U.S.87
based corporate actors like the film industry.
Before TRIPS negotiations formally began, "members of private
industry in the United States, concerned about inadequate foreign protection
of patents, championed a trade-based strategy for securing greater
protection of intellectual property rights."' 8 8 Besides national cooperation,
the U.S. industry group coalition reached across borders to establish
alliances with European and Japanese counterparts
to coordinate on mutual
89
IP interests during TRIPS negotiations.
The MPAA was an active actor in the TRIPS negotiation and drafting
process, especially in the area of copyright protection. The MPAA
demanded early on that the definition of "author" in the agreement include
corporations because, unlike the United States, many other countries
refused to recognize that corporations could be authors and limited
remuneration of royalty payments to "physical" authors.' 90 The U.S.
government included this demand in its submission of changes to the draft,
and pushed for these amendments "until the very last minute."' 9' The
MPAA was not content with merely lobbying the U.S. government. During
the last weeks of the Uruguay192Round, "representatives of the MPA were
working full-time in Geneva.",
In the end, the private sector lobbyists received 95% of what they
wanted. 193 TRIPS symbolized the strength of private sector actors who
cooperate and coordinate lobbying efforts in the international system. It is
now "almost impossible to interpret TRIPS provisions without the influence
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of the private sector."'' 94 As a result, the MPAA will continue to have an
influential role in future interpretations or enforcement of TRIPS provisions
with regard to movie copyrights.

C. Convention on Cultural Diversity
The 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of
the Diversity of Cultural Expression ("Convention on Cultural Diversity")
was the most recent multilateral treaty touching on the status of film in
international trade. Article 8 of the Convention allows states parties to
"take all a 9?ropriate measures to protect and preserve cultural
expressions."
While the objective of the treaty was generally "to protect and promote
the diversity of cultural expressions,"'' 96 the Convention was aimed at "the
pervasive importation of cultural products, such as films and television
programs, from economically dominant countries. ' 197 Not surprisingly,
France and Canada were the driving forces behind the Convention. Both
countries argued that the expression of national culture through mediums
such as film was "essential to national identities and therefore must be
treated separately from other goods in international trade negotiations."' 98
In contrast to earlier multilateral agreements, the United States tried
99
not to appear too identified with Hollywood interests during negotiations.
However, the U.S. film industry's global influence was a central factor in
discussions. France's culture minister, Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres, made
reference to the "current asymmetry of cultural power" which Hollywood
represented. 200 The United States also tried to establish alliances with other
countries that had similar commercial interests such as India, which had its
own successful "Bollywood" film industry. 20 1 However, India eventually
signed on to the Convention and took the position that the treaty related to
culture and not trade, and thus its impact was more symbolic than
substantive.2 °2
One hundred forty-eight countries ultimately supported the

194 Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO, supra note 36, at 824.
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Convention, and it was opposed only by the United States and Israel.2 °3
Louise Oliver, the U.S. ambassador to UNESCO, responded to the defeat
by declaring that the result was "extraordinarily disappointing" 20 4 and that
the Convention "remains too flawed, too open to misinterpretation and too
prone to abuse for us to support," as it "permit[s] governments to use
subsidies and quotas to promote culture. 2 °5
Hollywood feared that the Convention would provide countries with a
formal international instrument to justify greater quotas or subsidies to
domestic film industries on the basis of cultural preservation. MPAA
president Dan Glickman argued "[n]o one should use this convention to
close their borders to a whole host of products," and that the proper place
for trade was the WTO, not UNESCO. 20 6 Glickman further expressed the
MPAA's concern over the potential ramifications of the Convention:
"What's to stop a country saying207that it'll only take 20% of U.S. films, or
taxing our films but not its own?"
The Convention is unlikely to produce the dire effects that the MPAA
fears. Under Article 20 of the Convention, nothing in the treaty "shall be
interpreted as modifying rights and obligations of the Parties under any
other treaties to which they are parties., 20 8 Therefore all Parties to the
Convention are still required to adhere to their WTO obligations. While
Article 20 also provides that parties would need to take the Convention into
account in interpreting their other international obligations, 20 9 the
Convention, if ratified, would simply be another factor to consider during
future WTO negotiations on cultural products.2 10
VI. CONCLUSION
The MPAA has actively worked both through the U.S. government
and independently to advocate Hollywood interests in international trade
relations.
Over the past century, Washington and Hollywood have
developed a close relationship based on mutual interests and the U.S. film
industry's economic influence. This relationship has paid off for the
MPAA, as the United States has consistently advocated its interests in
bilateral trade relations around the world and in multilateral trade
agreements such as GATS, TRIPS, and the Convention on Cultural
Diversity.
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In recent years, however, the MPAA has lived up to its reputation as
"The Little State Department" by successfully acting on its own in
establishing independent bilateral agreements with foreign governments and
enforcing its IP rights abroad. This effective combination of close
cooperation with Washington and independent action indicates that
Hollywood will be able to maintain its dominant economic position in the
international film trade in the decades ahead.
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